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Abstract
We analyze public interventions to alleviate debt overhang among private rms when the
government has limited information and limited resources. We compare the e¢ ciency
of buying equity, purchasing existing assets, and providing debt guarantees. With sym-
metric information, all the interventions are equivalent. With asymmetric information
between rms and the government, buying equity dominates the two other interven-
tions. We solve for the optimal intervention, and show how it can be implemented with
subordinated loans and warrants.
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It is well understood since the seminal work of Myers (1977) that debt overhang can
lead to under-investment. Firms in nancial distress nd it di¢ cult to raise capital for new
investments because the proceeds from these new investments mostly serve to increase the
value of the existing debt instead of equity.
A theoretical solution to debt overhang is renegotiation between equity and debt holders.
If renegotiation is costless, e¢ ciency is restored. In practice, however, renegotiation often
requires bankruptcy, which is a costly process. Indeed, a large body of empirical research has
shown the economic importance of private renegotiation costs for rms in nancial distress
(see Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1994), Hennessy
(2004) among others). The social costs of renegotiation may be even larger than the private
costs because renegotiations can trigger creditor runs among other rms. Moreover, from
a theoretical perspective, one should expect renegotiation to be costly because otherwise
debt would not discipline managers or reduce risk shifting (Hart and Moore (1995), Jensen
and Meckling (1976)). Hence, debt holders are often dispersed which makes it di¢ cult to
renegotiate outside bankruptcy because of free-rider problems or contract incompleteness
(see Bulow and Shoven (1978), Gertner and Scharfstein (1991), and Bhattacharya and
Faure-Grimaud (2001)).
If the deadweight losses from debt overhang and bankruptcy are high, there might be
room for an intervention by the government. The government can alleviate the debt over-
hang problem by providing capital to rms directly. However, if the government intervenes,
this raises the question of how to intervene e¢ ciently.
The goal of our paper is analyze the optimal form of government intervention in a
standard model of debt overhang. In our model rms di¤er across two dimensions. The
rst dimension is the quality of their investment opportunities. If the quality of investment
opportunities is high, there is a welfare loss from not investing. The second dimension is
the quality of assets in place. If asset quality is low, debt overhang is severe and rms
under-invest. The information structure is such that, under symmetric information, the
government and rms only know the distribution of future investment opportunities and
asset values. Under asymmetric information, rms know the asset values and investment
opportunities of each rm but the government does not.
We compare three di¤erent interventions. The rst intervention is to purchase an equity
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stake in the rm. The second intervention is to buy a share of the rms assets. The third
intervention is to provide debt guarantees to the rm. We also consider combinations of the
three interventions and solve for the optimal intervention. The governments objective is to
trade o¤ the benets from reducing debt overhang and the expected cost of the intervention.
All government interventions under consideration alter the rms balance sheet and
thus change the rms incentives to invest under debt overhang. As a result, government
interventions create di¤erent payo¤ structures for the government, the equity holders, and
the debt holders. It is therefore far from obvious which intervention is more e¢ cient. In
fact, it is not even clear that there exists a ranking of interventions in terms of e¢ ciency.
Our analysis of interventions delivers two results. The rst result is that, if rms and the
government have the same information at the time that rms decide whether to participate
in a government program, all interventions are equivalent. The intuition for this result comes
in three steps. First, if rms and the government have the same information, the rms
participation constraint is the same under all programs. The government then extracts the
expected payo¤ from future investment opportunities by keeping equity holders to their
reservation utility. Second, all interventions reduce debt overhang to the same extent as
long as the interventions provide the same amount of nancing. Third, the cost to the
government is the implicit transfer to debt holders minus the expected gain from future
investment opportunities. This cost is the same across all interventions as long as the
government provides the same amount of nancing and extracts all surplus from equity
holders.
The second result is that, if rms have better information than the government at the
time that rms decide whether to participate in a government program, buying equity dom-
inates the two other interventions. The intuition for this result also comes in three steps.
First, under asymmetric information rms participate in interventions based on private
information about asset quality and investment opportunities. Hence, participating rms
receive informational rents. Second, since all interventions are equivalent under symmetric
information, the ranking of government interventions under asymmetric information has
to come from better selection and lower rents of participating rms. Third, under asym-
metric information there are many rms that opportunistically participate in a government
program even though they would invest without the program. Buying equity reduces oppor-
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tunistic participation more than other interventions because buying equity provides a share
in the rms assets and investment opportunities, while other interventions only provide a
share in the rms assets. As a result, rms with good assets and good investment oppor-
tunities are less likely to participate opportunistically under the equity program relative to
other programs.
Our results on symmetric versus asymmetric information also shed light on the compar-
ison between compulsory and voluntary interventions. The symmetric information case is
equivalent to compulsory participation under the constraint that the intervention is accept-
able for the average rm. With voluntary participation, rms select to participate based on
the value of assets in place and their investment opportunities. The endogenous selection
can be costly because rms with assets of lower quality are more likely to participate, but
it can also be benecial because rms with good investment opportunities are more likely
to participate. We can show that compulsory interventions dominate voluntary ones when
the intervention is large.
We then solve for the optimal intervention where the government provides a subordi-
nated loan (or buys preferred stock) in exchange for warrants. The loan is subordinated
because the government does not want to generate additional debt overhang. The govern-
ment asks for warrants because this allows the government to extract the entire surplus
from future investment opportunities. We show that this intervention is equivalent to the
optimal intervention in a setting where asset values and investment opportunities are known
to the government.
We also study three extensions of the model. The rst extension is to allow for hetero-
geneity of rm assets. This extension does not a¤ect the governments cost of buying equity
or providing debt guarantees but raises the cost of purchasing rm assets. The reason is
that rms choose to sell their lowest quality assets to the government. The second extension
is to allow for insurance of debt claims by the government. This extension is relevant for
nancial institutions to which the government provides deposit insurance. Deposit insur-
ance decreases the cost of intervention because the government is partly reducing expected
insurance payments. However, deposit insurance does not alter our results on the relative
e¢ ciency of the di¤erent interventions. The third extension is to allow for di¤erent struc-
tures of debt covenants. In our benchmark model, we assume that debt covenants prevent
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banks from selling safe assets. If we weaken this assumption and allow for the sale of safe
assets, the cost of asset purchases decreases because purchasing safe assets e¤ectively gives
priority to the government over debt holders.
This paper relates to the literature on government bailouts. Most of the literature
on government bailouts focuses on nancial institutions. Gorton and Huang (2004) argue
that there is a potential role for the government to bail out banks in distress because the
government can provide liquidity more e¤ectively than the private market. Diamond and
Rajan (2005) show that bank bailouts can increase excess demand for liquidity, which can
cause further insolvency and lead to a meltdown of the nancial system. Diamond (2001)
emphasizes that governments should only bail out banks that have specialized knowledge
about their borrowers. Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999) show that bank bailout policies
can be designed such that they do not distort ex-ante lending incentives relative to strict
bank closure policies. Kocherlakota (2009) analyzes resolutions to a banking crisis in a
setup where insurance provided by the government generates debt overhang. He analyzes
the optimal form of government intervention and nds an equivalence result similar to
our symmetric information equivalence theorem. Our papers di¤er because we focus on
debt overhang generated by the private sector and we consider the problem of endogenous
selection into the governments programs. Debt overhang also plays a fundamental role in
the model of Diamond and Rajan (2009).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets up the model. Section 2 solves for the
decentralized equilibrium with and without debt overhang. Section 3 describes the gov-
ernment interventions. Section 4 compares the interventions. Section 5 extends the model
to heterogeneous assets and deposit insurance. Section 6 discusses optimal mechanisms.
Section 7 discusses the nancial crisis of 2007-2009. Section 8 concludes.
1 Model
Our model is applicable to rms and nancial institutions alike but, for concreteness, we
focus on nancial institutions. For simplicity, we refer to all nancial institutions as banks.
The model has a continuum of banks of measure 1. Figure 1 summarizes the timing,
technology, and information structure of the model. The model has three dates t = 0; 1; 2.
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There is no discounting. Banks start time 0 with given initial assets and liabilities. At time
1 banks receive new investment opportunities, and they lend to and borrow from each other
and from outside investors. To avoid confusion with inter-bank lending, we use the word
investmentsto refer to the new loans that banks make to the non-nancial sector at time
1. All returns are realized at time 2, and prots are paid out to investors.
The government announces its interventions at time 0, but the implementation can
happen either at time 0 or at time 1. The di¤erence matters because banks learn about
the value of their existing assets and about their new investment opportunities at time 1.
Interventions at time 1 are therefore subject to adverse selection, while interventions at
time 0 are not. The two cases are empirically relevant, and we therefore analyze both.
1.1 Initial assets and liabilities
At time 0 banks have both assets and liabilities in place. All banks are ex-ante identical.
On the liabilities side, banks have long term debt. Long term debt is due at time 2. Let D
be the face value of long-term debt outstanding.
On the asset side, banks have three types of assets: cash, safe long-term assets, and
risky long-term assets. Cash is liquid and can be used for investments or for lending at
time 1. Let ct be cash holdings at the beginning of time t. All banks start time 0 with c0
in cash. Cash holdings cannot be negative:
ct  0 for all t:
Safe long-term assets deliver payo¤ A at time 2. Risky long-term assets deliver random
payo¤ a = A or a = 0 at time 2. We dene the probability of a good outcome as
p  Pr (a = A) :
At time 1 private investors learn the value of p for each bank.
We focus on the binary outcome model because it delivers the main insights while sim-
plifying the algebra. We will later extend our equivalence theorem to a general distribution
for a. Note that any binary asset payo¤ can be modeled using the risky/safe asset model.
For example, suppose that the payo¤s are AH in the good state and AL in the bad state.
To get back to the risky/safe model, we simply dene A = AL and A = AH  AL.
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1.2 Investment opportunities
At time 1 banks receive investment opportunities. Investments cost the xed amount x at
time 1 and deliver income v at time 2. The value of v is between 0 and V and banks learn
v at time 1. The joint distribution of p and v is
F (p; v) for p 2 [0; 1] and v 2 [0; V ] :
We dene the unconditional mean of p as
p  E [p] :
To make the problem interesting, we assume that individual banks do not have enough cash
to nance investment projects. To study debt overhang, we assume that debt is risky such
that long term debt D is in default when a = 0, but not when a = A. We also assume that
the payo¤ v from new investment is not su¢ cient to cover long term debt D.
Assumption A1: c0 < x < V < D  A < A
Assumptions A1 is maintained throughout the paper. Borrowing and lending at time 1 can
be among banks, or between banks and outside investors. We assume risk neutral investors
and we normalize the risk free rate to 0.
Assumption A2: Safe assets A are protected by debt covenants
Assumptions A2 protects debt holders from expropriation by equity holders. It is well known
that equity holders have incentives to engage in risk shifting at the expense of debt holders.
For instance, shareholders might decide to sell the safe assets and invest the proceeds in
risky projects. Debt covenants protect debt holders. Debt covenants play an important role
when we discuss asset buyback programs.
2 Equilibrium without intervention
In this section, we study the equilibrium without government intervention. We characterize
the rst best outcome, and the debt overhang equilibrium.
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2.1 Investor payo¤s
Figure 2 summarizes the payo¤s to equity holders. In order to nance investment, banks
can lend to and borrow from each other. Let l be the face value of borrowing at time 1 and
let r be the gross interest rate for interbank lending. At time 2 total bank income y is:
y = A+ a+ c2 + v  i;
where i is dummy for the decision to invest at time 1. Let yD, yl and ye be the payo¤s
at time 2 of long term debt, interbank lending, and equity, respectively. Long term debt
is senior to interbank lending l. Equity is junior to debt. There are no direct deadweight
losses from bankruptcy. Under the usual seniority rules, the payo¤s to investors are:
yD = min (y;D) ; yl = min(y   yD; rl); ye = y   yD   yl:
Under assumption A1, the payo¤s to investors depend on the realization of asset value a in
the following way. If a = A, all liabilities are fully repaid (yD = D and yl = rl) and equity
holders receive ye = y   D   rl. If a = 0, then long term debt holders receive all income
(yD = y) and other investors receive nothing: yl = ye = 0.
2.2 First best
Figure 3 depicts the investment region in the rst best equilibrium. Without intervention,
the banks simply carry their cash holdings from period 0 to period 1, so c1 = c0. The
interbank lending market opens at time 1. The rst best assumption is that banks choose
investments at time 1 to maximize total value V1 = A+E1 [a] + c2 + v  i E1

yl

, subject
to the time 1 budget constraint
c2 = c1 + l   x  i: (1)
The break even constraint for outside lenders is:
E1
h
yl
i
 l: (2)
Using assumption A1, there is excess aggregate liquidity to nance the investment, and the
break even constraint (2) binds: E1

yl

= l. Using (1), this implies that
V1 = A+ E1 [a] + c1 + (v   x)  i:
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Therefore, investment takes place in the domain:
I  f(p; v) j v > xg :
Proposition 1 The rst best solution is for investment to take place at time 1 if and only
if v > x, irrespective of the value of p.
Two properties of the rst best solution are worth mentioning. First, the interest rate is
bank specic since equation (2) is simply r = 1=p. Second, there is a natural connection
between maximizing shareholder value and maximizing total value. We can always write
V1 = E1

y   yl = E1 ye + yD. The maximization program for total value is equivalent to
the maximization of shareholder value E1 [ye] as long as we allow renegotiation and transfer
payments between shareholders and debt holders.
2.3 Debt overhang
We assume that banks maximize shareholder value instead of total value. Under the risky
debt assumption A1, shareholder value maximization leads to the classic debt overhang
problem.
Figure 4 depicts the investment region in the debt overhang equilibrium. Consider the
market at time 1. Shareholders get nothing if the bad state realizes at time 2, and if the
good state realizes they get c2 + A + A + v  i  D   rl. The bank maximizes shareholder
value subject to budget constraint (1) and break even constraint for new investors (2). The
condition for investment becomes
v   x > (r   1) l: (3)
This is the investment condition under debt overhang.
Recall that the rst best investment rule was simply v  x > 0. The di¤erence with the
rst best investment rule comes from two critical properties. First, the outside investors
ask for a risk premium because they know that lending is risky. Hence r > 1. Second,
shareholders perceive a high cost of funds because they do not get the returns of the in-
vestment project in the bad state. In the rst best world, they would renegotiate with the
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debt holders. Debt overhang follows from the assumption that debt contracts cannot be
renegotiated, or at least not quickly enough to seize the investment opportunity.
A constrained rm would always choose to invest its own cash rst, so c2 = 0, and
l = x   c1. Since c1 = c0, Equation (3) becomes pv + (1  p) c0 > x and we get the
investment domain:
Io  f(p; v) j Lo (p; v) > 0g ; (4)
where we dene
Lo (p; v)  pv + (1  p) c0   x: (5)
If Lo (p; v) < 0, no investment takes place. If Lo (p; v) > 0, investment takes place using the
free cash c0 and the additional borrowing x  c0. The function Lo (p; v) measures the value
for shareholders of undertaking a new investment under debt overhang, given the quality of
the existing assets p, the available cash c0, and the fundamental value of new investment v.
From the perspective of shareholders, the NPV of the investment is pv   x. Internal cash
c0 has a lower opportunity cost than external nancing because from the equity holders
perspective internal cash has an expected value of p but external nancing has an expected
cost of pr = 1.
2.4 Shareholder value and welfare losses
We repeatedly use the time 0 and time 1 equity value to compute equity holders optimal
investment and participation decisions. The equity value at time 1 is
E1 [y
ejp; v] = p (N + c0) + Lo (p; v) 1(p;v)2Io (6)
where
N  A+A D:
Equity value at time 1 is the sum of two terms. The rst term is the equity holders
expected value of long term assets and cash minus senior debt. The value is multiplied by
probability p because equity holders only receive a payment in the high-payo¤ state. The
second term is the equity holders value of new investment opportunities Lo (p; v) as dened
above.
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Taking expectations at time 0, the equity value is:
E0 [y
e] = p (N + c0) +
ZZ
Io
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) (7)
The rst term is the expected equity value of long term assets and cash minus senior debt
using the unconditional probability of solvency p. The second term is the time 0 expected
value of new investment opportunities. The domain Io is dened in Equation (4). Since
investment is chosen optimally, the value of new investment opportunities Lo (p; v) is zero
on the border of Io.
Social welfare under debt overhang depends on the set of implemented investment
projects Io. We dene W (:) as the social welfare function, so that welfare under debt
overhang is
W (Io) : (8)
As long as the second best investment set Io is strictly smaller than the rst best investment
set I, there is a welfare loss. In the banking context, these deadweight losses are missed
trading and lending opportunities. We assume the social welfare function incorporates
deadweight losses to both banks and borrowers. Hence, the welfare function is independent
of how the benets of investment projects are shared among banks and borrowers.
Note that equation (8) assumes that investment projects are bank specic. This as-
sumption is justied by the large literature in banking which argues that one of the main
functions of nancial intermediaries is to generate private information about their borrowers
(see for instance Diamond (1984)), and that it is costly for borrowers to switch to other
banks or other sources of funds.
3 Description of government interventions
We consider three government interventions: asset buy backs, cash against equity, and debt
guarantees. We rst discuss the governments objective function and then briey describe
each intervention.
3.1 Government objective function and constraints
The objective of the government is to minimize the welfare losses from missed investment
opportunities and the costs of intervention. Let 	 be the expected cost of a government
11
intervention. Let  be the marginal deadweight losses associated with raising taxes and
administering government interventions. The objective function of the government is
max
 
W (I ( ))  	( )
where   are the parameters chosen by a specic government intervention. For simplicity,
we assume that the marginal cost  is constant. This means that the government cares
about expected costs, but not about the distribution of these costs.
The expected costs of the program depend on the time of participation. At time 0, all
banks are identical and information is symmetric. At time 1, the banks learn the value of
their investment opportunities and the expected value of their long term assets. The type
of a bank is a two-dimensional random variable (p; v) realized at time 1.
We place constraints on the interventions of the government. First, we do not allow
the government to change the priority rules of nancial contracts and we assume that the
government cannot make debt holders worse o¤. These restrictions rule out government
interventions such as forced bankruptcy, forced asses sales, and debt equity swaps, which
would result in losses to debt holders. We also assume that the government cannot make
payments directly contingent on the banksnew investments. This rules out directed lend-
ing. Finally, we assume that the government can restrict dividend payments to shareholders.
Otherwise banks would simply pay out proceeds from government interventions as a divi-
dend to shareholders.
3.2 Description of asset buy back program
The asset buy back program is parameterized by Z and pz. The government announces at
time 0 that it is willing to purchase risky assets up to an amount Z at a per unit price of
pz in exchange for cash. If a bank decides to participate and sell z < Z, long term assets
become A1 = A  z and cash c1 = c0 + zpz.
We note that the government can only buy risky but not safe long term assets. The
reason is that under Assumption A2 debt covenants prevent equity holders from selling safe
assets. This assumption is important because, as we show below, equity holders can extract
rents from debt holders by selling safe assets. The intuition is that safe asset sales change
the priority structure of nancial claims and e¤ectively give equity holders priority over
12
debt holders.
The government can o¤er banks to participate in the asset buy back program at time
0, at time 1, or at both times. The time of participation is important because at time 1
banks learn about the value of investment opportunities and the expected value of long
term assets. Due to the option value of new information, banks always choose to wait with
their decision until time 1 if possible. Without loss of generality, we thus only consider
government programs with participation at either time 0 or at time 1, not at both times.
At time 0, we can without loss of generality consider programs where all banks partici-
pate because all banks are identical and the government can always set Z = 0: The expected
cost of the time 0 asset buy back program is
	a0(Z; p
z) = z0 (p
z   p) with z0 < Z
where z0 is the face value of assets purchased by the government. The government pays out
z0p
z at time 0 and receives z0 in the high-payo¤ state with probability p.
At time 1, the cost of the asset buy back program is di¤erent because banks learn
the value of investment opportunity v and the value of long term assets p before deciding
whether to participate. The expected cost is therefore
	a1 (Z; p
z) =
Z Z
(v;p)
z1(Z; p
z; v; p)  (pz   p)dF (v; p)
where z1 is the face value of risky long term assets sold under the program. This formulation
allows for adverse selection because banks may participate in the program depending on
their type (v; p).
3.3 Description of equity injection program
Equity injection programs are parameterized by m and . The government announces at
time 0 that it is willing to o¤er cash m against a fraction  of equity returns. Similar to
the asset buy back program, the government can o¤er banks to participate in this program
at time 0 or time 1. If a bank decides to participate, its cash position becomes c1 = c0+m.
The expected cost of the program at time 0 is
	e0 (m;) = m  E0 [ye (m)]
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where E0 [ye (m)] is the expected equity return at time 0 conditional on cash injection m.
In words, the government pays out m at time 0 and receives a share  of equity returns ye
at time 2. There are no constraints on that program, except m  0 and  2 [0; 1]. The
expected cost of the time 1 program is
	e1 (m;) =
Z Z
(v;p)
e(m;; v; p)  (m  E1 [ye (m) jv; p])dF (v; p)
where e is an indicator variable whether a bank participates in the program, and E1 [ye (m) jv; p]
is the expected equity return at time 1 conditional on cash injection m and and bank type
(v; p). Similar to the asset buy back program, this formulation allows for adverse selection
depending on bank type (v; p).
3.4 Description of debt guarantee program
Debt guarantee programs are parameterized by S and . The government announces at
time 0 that it is willing to guarantee new bank debt up to a face value of S and charges
banks a fee  per unit of lending. There are several equivalent ways to dene the parameters
S and . In our notation, the fee is paid up-front and the upper bound applies to the face
value of new bank debt. Let s be the face value of new bank debt issued under the program
and let rs be the interest rate on debt issued under the program. The amount of money
raised at time is therefore s=rs   s and the constraint is s < S (we will see shortly that
rs = 1 in equilibrium). At time 0, the expected cost to the government is
	g0 (S; ) = s0 (1    p) :
The expected cost to the government is the probability of the low-payo¤ state (1  p) minus
the guarantee fee :
At time 1, the expected cost of the government is
	g1 (S; ) =
Z Z
(v;p)
s1 (S; ; v; p) (1  p  ) dF (v; p): (9)
Similar to the other programs, the time 1 debt guarantee allows for adverse selection de-
pending on bank type (v; p):
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4 Comparison of government interventions
Our main result is that all interventions are equivalent at time 0, but equity injections dom-
inate both asset buy backs and debt guarantees at time 1. Equivalence of two interventions
means that both interventions implement the same level of investment at the same expected
cost to the government. Dominance of two interventions means that two interventions im-
plement the same level of investment but the dominant intervention has a lower costs than
the dominated intervention. To build the intuition for our result we rst present two useful
lemmas, one for providing free cash to banks and one for debt guarantees.
The following investment domain I (m) plays a key role in our discussions.
Denition 1 Let the domain I (m) be dened by
I (m)  f(p; v) j Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m > 0g : (10)
4.1 Equilibrium with free cash injections at time 0
We rst discuss the case of providing free cash to banks at 0. That is, the government
simply gives cash m to each bank, without asking for anything in return. This case is
a useful benchmark because it illustrates how free cash injections a¤ect the investment
region. In terms of the government programs, free cash injections are equivalent to an
equity injection m with equity share  = 0; an asset buy back program with face value
Z ! 0 and cash injection pzZ = m; and a debt guarantee program with face value S = m
and guarantee fee  = 0. The following lemma characterizes free cash injections.
Lemma 1 A free cash injection leads to the following welfare function for the government
W (I (m))  m
Proof. Suppose the government injects m in each bank so that initial liquidity becomes
c1 = c0+m. From equation (4) and (5), we see that the investment domain becomes I (m)
and the total cost is 	e0 (m; 0) = m since the number of banks is normalized to one.
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Figure 5 shows the e¤ect of the free cash injection on the investment region I (m) : The cash
injection m relaxes the investment constraint and therefore expands the set of implemented
investment projects. If the cash injection is large enough to cover the entire nancing need
x   c0, then the cash injection can eliminate the entire debt overhang. In other words,
I (x  c0) = I.
4.2 Equilibrium with debt guarantee at time 1
We now discuss the equilibrium with a debt guarantee at time 1. The comparison of the
debt guarantee with free cash injection illustrates the main incentive e¤ects of government
interventions. To compute the banksoptimal investment and participation decision, we
use the expected equity value. We obtain the equity value at time 0 and time 1 be replacing
c0 by c0 +m and Io by I (m) in equations (6) and (7).
Banks benet from the debt guarantee by the government because it allows them to issue
riskless debt. The equilibrium interest rate on riskless debt is rs = 1 and the equilibrium
interest rate on unsecured debt ru = 1=p. The time 1 budget constraint (1) becomes
c2 = c0 + lu + (1  ) s  x; (11)
and the investment condition (3) becomes
Lo (p; v) + s (1    p) > 0: (12)
It is clear from the budget constraint (11) that the government never wants to set S above
x  c0 since this could not possibly help the nancing of new investment opportunities.
Also note that the government wants to design an intervention such that banks only
participate in the program if they invest. Otherwise, the program would provide a subsidy
to banks that make no investments. As discussed above, we assume that the government
does not observe new lending and therefore cannot make participation contingent on new
investments. It is therefore important to impose a no ine¢ cient participationconstraint
(NIP from now on). Payo¤s to equity holders in the good state are A D+ c2  s, so from
equation (11) it is clear that the NIP constraint is:
 > 0: (13)
We summarize this brief discussion in the following lemma.
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Lemma 2 It is enough to consider debt guarantees such that S 2 [0; x  c0] and  > 0.
Next we consider the choice between secured and unsecured borrowing. It is clear from
(12) that banks take up the debt guarantee rather than the unsecured lending if and only if
p < 1  . Otherwise, banks prefer borrowing on the unsecured interbank lending market.
This denes an upper-bound schedule for participation, Ug1 (p; v;S; ) < 0, where:
Ug1 (p; v;S; )  p+   1: (14)
Because of the upper bound, if p 2 [1  ; 1], banks do not participate in the program.
However, if the bank type (p; v) 2 Io, the bank invests even without the debt guarantee
from the program.
If p < 1   , banks prefer to participate in the debt guarantee program. Since the
payo¤s are linear in s, banks choose the maximum guarantee: s = S. This implies unsecured
borrowing lu = x (1  )S c0 if the banks invest. Equation (12) leads to the lower bound
schedule for investment, Lg1 (p; v;S; ) > 0, where:
Lg1 (p; v;S; )  Lo (p; v) + (1    p)S (15)
We now have a complete description of the participation and investment decisions.
The structure comprises four elements and this structure is the same for all government
interventions.
First, there is an NIP constraint (13) which means that the program cannot be too
generous. The NIP constraint is like a haircut and denes an upper-schedule (14) above
which banks do not participate in the government intervention. In the case of the debt
guarantee program, the upper-schedule is vertical (it does not depend on v), but in general
it is a function of p and v (as in the case of cash against equity, see below).
Second, there is a lower-schedule (15) under which banks are unwilling to invest even
with the assistance of the government. These banks do not participate in the program and
do not invest. In the case of the debt guarantee program, the lower schedule is a function
of the bank type (p; v) and the guarantee fee : The lower-schedule and the upper-schedule
dene the participation set:

g1 (S; ) = f(p; v) j Lg1 (p; v;S; ) > 0 ^ Ug1 (p; v;S; ) < 0g (16)
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Third, the lower-schedule denes the investment domain. The investment domain is the
combination of the initial debt overhang set Io (banks that would invest even without the
governments intervention) and the participation set 
:
Ig1 (S; ) = I
o [ 
g1 (S; ) : (17)
Note that the overlap between the two sets, Io\
g1 (S; ), represents opportunistic participa-
tion. Opportunistic participation is ine¢ cient, because the government provides a subsidy
to banks that would have invested even in the absence of the government intervention.
Fourth, the participation set determines the expected cost of the government interven-
tion. Using equation (9), the expected cost of the debt guarantee program is
g1 (S; )  S
Z Z

g1(S;)
(1  p  ) dF (p; v) : (18)
Figure 6 shows the investment set and participation set for debt guarantees provided at time
1. The gure distinguishes three regions of interest: e¢ cient participation, opportunistic
participation, and invest alone. The e¢ cient participation region comprises the banks that
participate in the intervention and that invest because of the intervention. The opportunistic
region comprises the banks that participate in the intervention but would have invested even
in the absence of the intervention. The invest alone region comprises the banks that do not
participate in the program and invest without government intervention. As is clear from
the gure, the governments trade-o¤ is between expanding the e¢ cient participation region
and reducing the opportunistic participation region.
We summarize these results in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 A time 1 debt guarantee program (S; ) delivers welfare function W (Ig1 (S; ))
and has the expected cost g1 (S; ) :
We can compare the debt guarantee with the free cash injections:
Proposition 2 Debt guarantees at time 1 always dominate free cash injections at time 0.
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Proof. Consider a debt guarantee with  = 0 and S = m. Both interventions achieve
the same investment domain since Ig1 (m; 0) = I (m). However, the participation set for the
time 1 debt guarantee is smaller than the participation set of the free cash injection. As a
result, the expected cost of the debt guarantee g1 (m; 0) is smaller than the expected cost
of the free cash injection m.
In general, we see that debt guarantees are less costly than free cash injections because
of three separate reasons. First, the NIP constraint ensures that only banks that invest
participate in the debt guarantee program but with free cash injections also banks that
do not invest participate in the program. Second, under the debt guarantee program the
government only pays out insurance if the bank defaults and is compensated by fee 
otherwise but under free cash injection the government always pays out cash. Third, under
the debt guarantee some healthy banks invest alone without participating in the program,
but all banks participate in the free cash injection.
We also note that risk shifting plays an important role in our model. Even though we
assume that v is known at time 1, equity holders have an incentive for risk shifting. Indeed,
from the perspective of shareholders, selling risky assets is similar to anti-risk-shifting, and
refusing to sell assets is like risk shifting.
4.3 Comparison of time 0 programs
We now compare government programs at time 0. In these programs, the banks must opt
in or out at time 0, when information is symmetric. We have the following proposition:
Theorem 1 Equivalence of time 0 programs - binary model. A time 0 risky asset
buy back program (Z; pz) is equivalent to a time 0 debt guarantee program with S = Z and
pz = 1  . It is also equivalent to a time 0 equity injection (m;), where m = Zpz and pz
and  are chosen such that at time 0 all banks are indi¤erent between participating and not
participating in the program. All programs deliver the same investment set I (m) and have
the same expected costs
0 (m)  (1  p)m m
Z Z
I(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(m)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) (19)
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Proof. See Appendix.
The key to this equivalence result is that banks are forced to decide to participate in the
programs before they receive information about investment opportunities and asset values.
Banks are thus identical and the government optimally chooses the program parameters
such that banks are indi¤erent between participating and not participating. For a xed
program amount, the government extracts all rents from the intervention. The cost to
the government is thus independent of whether banks are charged through assets sales,
guarantee fees, or equity shares.
It is important to emphasize that we are comparing pure time 0 interventions here,
where no further interaction between the banks and the government occurs at time 1. We
are not claiming that these pure time 0 interventions are optimal. In fact, they are not. It
is always better for the government to sell at time 0 an option to participate in a time 1
program. We return to this idea later.
It is also important to understand the cost function 0 (m) by looking at the three terms
on the RHS of equation (19). The rst term reects the fact that, in the bad state, the cash
injection is received by long-term debt holders. The second term is the gain in borrowing
costs conditional on being in the investment set. The third term is the subsidy to new
investments. It contributes positively to the cost since Lo (p; v) < 0 for all (p; v) 2 I (m)nIo.
Note that 0 (m) > 0 since the rst term dominates the second and the third is positive.
We can now discuss the role of assumption A2.
Proposition 3 Safe assets sale. If we relax Assumption A2, a program to sell Z < A
safe assets at time 0 in exchange for cash m has an expected cost of 0 (m)  (1  p)Z:
The intuition is that a sale of safe assets changes the priority structure of nancial claims.
In the bad state, the government receives payo¤ Z which would otherwise have gone to the
debt holders. This transfer from the debt holders lowers the cost for the government. This
discussion shows that selling safe assets is yet another way to get around the renegotiation
issue. But note that this is unlikely to be e¢ cient from an ex-ante perspective, since
covenants to protect debt holders are valuable only if they are credible.
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In market value terms, debt holders do not lose, as long as m  Z. If Z is high enough,
then the government can implement m = Z and the cost becomes
 m
ZZ
Io
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(m)nIo
(Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m) dF (p; v) ;
which is negative. In this case, the government would make money by capturing some of
the rents. The debt holders break even if the rm does not invest since m = Z, and are
strictly better o¤ if the rm invest since v > m = Z. Of course, in practice it is di¢ cult to
separate assets just as it is di¢ cult to do project nancing. We do not argue that this is a
realistic case, but we nd it helpful to understand the nature of the economic problem.
We can further extend the model to allow for a continuous asset distribution instead of
the binary setup. Suppose at time 1, banks learn the parameter p 2 [0; 1] and update the
distribution to G(:jp) over the support [0; A] for all p: The ex-ante distribution of (p; v) is
F (p; v), so the ex-ante distribution of a is
f0 (a) =
Z 1
p=0
Z V
v=0
g(ajp)dF (p; v) :
To compare the interventions, we need to dene debt covenants for a continuous asset
distribution. We assume covenants are e¢ cient in the sense that for any distribution func-
tion F debt holders receive at least the expected payo¤ they would receive without asset
buy backs. This assumption ensures that debt holders have priority over asset buy backs.
We also need to dene the priority structure of junior creditors and debt issued under
the debt guarantee. We assume that junior creditors are senior to debt issued under the
debt guarantee. This assumption ensures that the government does not create its own debt
overhang.
Theorem 2 Equivalence of time 0 programs - continuous distribution case. A
time 0 equity injection is equivalent to a time 0 asset buy back program with e¢ cient
covenants and equivalent to a time 0 debt guarantee program in which junior creditors have
priority over guaranteed debt.
Proof. See Appendix.
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We think the generalization of the equivalence theorem to the continuous asset case is
helpful for two reasons. First, and most importantly, we show that the equivalence theorem
holds for the continuous asset case under reasonable specications for debt covenants and
debt guarantees.
Second, the continuous asset case claries the importance of the priority structure in
designing government interventions. This is helpful because in the binary model all claims
other than senior debt are either completely paid o¤ or not paid at all.
Specically, for debt guarantees the guaranteed debt has to be junior to borrowing at
time 1. Under this assumption, the debt issued under the debt guarantee is e¤ectively
equivalent to buying preferred shares in the bank. The intuition is that the equivalence
theorem holds as long as guaranteed debt does not generate its own debt overhang and
therefore does not a¤ect borrowing costs at time 1.
Similarly, e¢ cient covenants ensure that senior debt holders have priority over asset buy
backs. This assumption is equivalent to the covenant assumption A2 in the binary model.
As discussed above, without covenants, the government can alter the priority structure by
buying safe assets. We do not want to rule out such an intervention but we think ex-ante
debt holders have strong incentives to demand e¢ cient debt covenants. Hence, e¢ cient
debt covenants generate a priority structure for asset buy backs that is equivalent to the
two other interventions.
4.4 Comparison of time 1 programs
Let us now compare the time 1 programs. In these programs, the banks must opt in or out
at time 1, when information is asymmetric. We have the following proposition:
Theorem 3 Equivalence of asset buy-backs and debt guarantees at time 1. An
asset buy back program (Z; pz) with participation at time 1 is equivalent to a debt guarantee
program with S = Z and pz = 1  .
Proof. See Appendix.
Note that the allocation features adverse selection, such that banks only participate in the
program if the expected value of their assets p is less than the price pz o¤ered by the
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government. This feature of the solution is a natural outcome of a setup in which banks
know more about asset values than the government. The frequently made argument that
asset buy backs or cash against equity have to occur at fair market value is not feasible
because banks only participate in the program if the the program recapitalizes at rates
above market value.
Theorem 4 Dominance of equity injection at time 1. For any asset buy back program
(Z; pz) with participation at time 1, there is an equity program that achieves the same
allocation at a lower cost for the government.
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 7 depicts the equilibrium with equity injection at time 1. The intuition is the
following. First, we must understand the net e¤ects of dilution. They are captured by the
function
X (p;m;)  (1  )m  p (N + c0) :
This function is intuitive: (1  )m is the net value of cash injected by the government,
and p (N + c0) is the dilution of the claims on old assets. So X measures the cash value
of government transfers under the program. The participation set in the equity program
takes the form

e1 (m;) = f(p; v) j Le1 (p; v;m;) > 0 ^ U e1 (p; v;m;) < 0g :
This can be compared to the participation set in equation (16). The lower bound is dened
by
Le1 (p; v;m;)  (1  )Lo (p; v) +X (p;m;) :
We note that X is the cash transfer and (1  )Lo (p; v) is the diluted value of new in-
vestments. It is optimal to opt in and invest if Le1 (p; v;m;) > 0. The upper bound for
participation is
U e1 (p; v;m;)  Lo (p; v) X (p;m;) :
By not participating, the rm foregoes the transfers X (p;m;) but avoids the dilution of
its new project. Hence, it is optimal to invest without the assistance of the government
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when U e1 (p; v;m;) > 0. Finally, the NIP constraint is
X (1;m;) < 0:
The NIP constraint ensures that the government does not provide cash to banks that do
not plan to invest. In this case, the cash is transferred one for one between the good and
the bad state, so the condition is (1  )m <  (N + c0). This condition is the same as
X < 0 for banks whose assets are safe, i.e., the banks for which p = 1. It also means that
X (p;m;)  (1  ) (1  p)m and therefore the investment domain is strictly smaller than
in the pure cash injection: Ie1 (m;)  I (m). The reason is that rms with high p and low
v opt out to avoid dilution.
To understand why equity injections are better than the other interventions, consider a
given asset buy back program. It has a lower schedule that determines the investment set,
and thus the welfare function W . Now choose the equity program to have exactly the same
lower schedule and thus the same investment set as the asset buy back program.
The rst point to understand is that equity injections induce less opportunistic partic-
ipation. This is because it is costly for good banks to dilute their valuable equity. Hence
the upper schedule is tighter. Of course, the two programs have di¤erent cost functions,
so the fact that the participation set is smaller is not enough to show that equity injec-
tions are cheaper than asset buy backs. However, the same reasons that make the upper
schedule tighter also limit the rents earned as (p; v) move away from the lower frontier
Le1 (p; v;m;) = 0. Finally, it is easy to show that, once the lower schedules are the same,
the NIP constraints are also equivalent. This shows that, for any asset buy back, or any
debt guarantee program, there exists an equity injection program that delivers exactly the
same investment set, but for a lower cost to the government. The lower cost comes from
two sources: less opportunistic participation and smaller rents conditional on participation.
4.5 Time 0 versus time 1
Let us now compare the programs at times 0 and 1. From the perspective of the government,
at time 0 there is adverse selection with respect to p since banks with bad assets are more
likely to participate. There is also benecial selection with respect to v since banks without
investment projects are less likely to participate. We consider a change in the distribution
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of both p and v:
Proposition 4 Comparison of time 0 and time 1 programs.
 Consider two distribution functions F and ~F for the parameters (p; v). If ~F dominates
F in the sense of rst order stochastic dominance, then, for any investment domain
I, the cost of the time 0 program is lower with ~F than with F .
 Time 1 programs always dominate time 0 programs when few banks have positive NPV
projects (i.e., Pr (v > x)! 0).
 Time 0 programs always dominate time 1 programs when most banks have positive
NPV projects (i.e., Pr (v > x) ! 1) and the government wants to implement a large
program (m! x  c0, I ! I)
Proof. See Appendix.
The understand the rst result, note that a rst order stochastic dominance shift increases
the likelihood that banks will be in the investment region. Banks in the investment region
invest because the equity value is larger with investment than without investment. Since
the government extracts all surplus from investment and the costs of time 0 programs
are independent of the distribution F (p; v), a rst order stochastic dominance shift always
reduces the cost of government intervention at time 0.
To understand the second result, note that for every asset buy back program at time 0,
we can construct an asset buy back program at time 1 that generates the same investment
region by setting the asset price pz at time 1 equal to one and choosing time 1 program size
Z such that it generates the same cash injection as the time 0 asset buy back program. If
Pr (v > x)! 0 no bank receives an investment opportunity. Hence, there is no investment
under any program. However, a time 0 asset buy back program yields a positive cost
(because all banks participate) and a time 1 program yields zero cost (because nobody
participates).
As more banks receive good investment opportunities, the cost of the time 0 program
decreases because it extracts all rents from better investment opportunities. In contrast, the
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cost of time 1 asset buy backs increases because more banks participate and participating
banks receive informational rents. This trade-o¤ explains the third result.
A natural interpretation of time 0 versus time 1 is in terms of compulsory versus volun-
tary participation. Of course, compulsory participation without constraint does not make
sense, so we impose the constraint that government o¤ers have to be acceptable on aver-
age (for instance, a well diversied equity investor would accept the o¤er on behalf of all
the banks). Our results can then be interpreted as follows: when interventions are large,
and the government expect that most banks have positive NPV projects (positive franchise
value), then it is better to do it early with compulsory participation. On the other hand,
when interventions are small, or if most banks do not have valuable new projects, then it
is better to do it ex-post based on voluntary participation.
5 Extensions
5.1 Heterogeneous assets within banks
We consider an extension of our model to allow for asset heterogeneity within banks. Sup-
pose that the face value of assets at time 0 is A+A0. All these assets are ex-ante identical.
At time 1, the bank learns which assets are A0 and which assets are A. The A assets are
just like before, with probability p of A and 1   p of 0. The A0 assets are worth zero with
certainty. The ex-ante problems are unchanged, so all programs are still equivalent at time
0.
The equity and debt guarantee programs are unchanged at time 1. So equity still
dominates debt guarantee. But the asset buy back program at time 1 is changed. For any
price pz > 0 the banks will always want to sell their A0 assets. This will be true in particular
of the banks without protable lending opportunities.
Proposition 5 With heterogeneous assets inside banks, there is a strict ranking of pro-
grams: equity is best, debt guarantee is intermediate, buy back program is worse.
The main insight from this extension is that adverse selection across banks is di¤erent from
adverse selection across assets within banks. Adverse selection within banks increases the
cost of the asset buy back program but does not a¤ect the other programs.
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Corollary 1 For asset buy backs to be optimal, the market failure must come from private
information among private agents.
Of course, this is only a necessary condition. It remains to be seen if and how an asset buy
back program can be optimal in the case of adverse selection in the private sector (Philippon
and Skreta (2009)).1
5.2 Deposit Insurance
Suppose long term debt consists of two types of debt: deposits  and unsecured long term
debt B such that
D = +B:
Suppose that the government provides insurance for deposit holders and that deposit holders
have priority over unsecured debt holders. Then the payo¤s are are:
y = min (y;) ; yB = min
 
y   y; B
We consider two separate cases. The rst case is safe deposits if  < A + c0 and the
second case is risky deposits if   A+ c0:
Proposition 6 With safe deposits, the cost and benets of both time 0 and time 1 programs
remain unchanged.
Proof. See Appendix.
If deposits are safe, banks always have su¢ cient time 2 income to repay deposit holders.
Hence, the expected cost of deposit insurance is zero independent of whether there is a gov-
ernment intervention. As a result, the costs and benets of all programs remain unchanged.
Proposition 7 With risky deposits, the costs of time 0 and time 1 programs decrease. The
equivalence results and ranking of both time 0 and time 1 programs remain unchanged. If de-
posits are su¢ ciently large, time 0 programs dominate time 1 programs and the government
can implement the rst best at negative cost.
1 It is worth pointing out that adverse selection can be mitigated by debt overhang. In our simple model,
the maximization of shareholder value does not create adverse selection because a xed rate would not
attract the low type (low p). By contrast, total rm value maximization would lead to adverse selection.
Hence it is clear that the two market failures are best studied in separate models.
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Proof. See Appendix.
With risky deposits, the government has to pay out deposit insurance in the low-payo¤
state. Hence, every cash injection at time 0 lowers the expected cost of deposit insurance in
the low-payo¤ state one-for-one. As a result, the government recoups its entire investment
both in the high- and low-payo¤ state. Put di¤erently, the time 0 cash injection represents
a wealth transfer to depositors and, because of deposit insurance, a wealth transfer to the
government. Also note that the government extracts all benets of increased lending ex-ante
by keeping equity holders to their reservation utility. As a result, the government receives
the expected net benet of increased lending and thus the expected cost is negative.
6 Optimal programs
In this section, we characterize the constrained optimal intervention. The two constraints
faced by the government are its inability to force debt holders to renegotiate outside bank-
ruptcy, and its inability to observe the types of banks. We note that the government cannot
overcome the second constraint by learning about asset values and investment opportunities
from observed asset prices such as equity prices and credit default swap prices. The reason
is that assets prices also reect the perceived likelihood of future government interventions,
so the government cannot use these prices to learn about the fundamental values that would
prevail without intervention. Interestingly, however, we will show that the constrained op-
timal intervention implements the same outcome as if the government knew asset values
and investment opportunities.
6.1 Time 0
Proposition 8 Any time 0 program can be improved by making participation at time 1
voluntary and selling at time 0 the option to participate at time 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
A practical example is the debt guarantee program. It is ine¢ cient to force banks to
issue S at time 0. It is better to sell them at time 0 the right to issue secured debt at time 1.
In this way, banks who end up without investment opportunities do not participate, banks
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who can invest alone also do not participate, and everyone pays at time 0 the present value
of the option to participate.
Corollary 2 An optimal time 0 program is to sell at time 0 the option to participate in an
optimal time 1 program.
6.2 Time 1
The following proposition extends the result of Theorem 4
Proposition 9 Equity programs at time 1 cannot be improved by mixing them with a debt
guarantee or asset buy back program. Pure equity programs always dominate.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now consider optimal programs. The constraints we impose are that the debt holders
cannot be worse o¤ and that the government cannot alter the priority of claims. Hence, the
government can inject cash m at time 1 in exchange for state contingent payo¤s at time 2.
Junior creditor at time 1 must be repaid, so assuming the government can commit to repay
junior creditors, we can without loss of generality restrict our attention to the case where
the government payo¤s depend on the residual payo¤s y   yD   yl.
In general, however, the government could o¤er a menu of contracts to the banks. A
menu of contracts can be used to obtain various investment sets. The optimal choice depends
on the distribution of types F (p; v) and the welfare function W so we cannot say in general
which set is optimal. However, we can examine cost minimization for any given investment
set. This is what we do now.
Lemma 4 Any program with voluntary participation of shareholders over the set 
 and no
renegotiation with debt holders has a minimum cost of
	min (
) =  
ZZ


Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
Proof. Voluntary participation means that shareholders must get at least p (N + c0).
With no renegotiation with debt holders, the government and old equity holders must share
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the residual surplus whose value is
p (N + c0) + L
o (p; v)
Hence the expected net payments to the government must be
ZZ


Lo (p; v) dF (p; v). These
are negative as long as 
 extends the debt overhang investment set, hence the positive
minimum cost.
To understand this result, suppose the government can make type contingent o¤ers
conditional on new investments. For type (p; v), the net value of new investment is Lo (p; v)
which is negative outside the Io region. So the minimum the government has to pay such
that it is optimal for type (p; v) to invest is  Lo (p; v).
Proposition 10 Consider the program   = fm;h; "g where the government o¤ers a junior
loan m at time 1 at the rate h in exchange for (1  ") =" warrants at the strike price N +c0.
This implements the investment set
I ( ) = Ig1 (S; )
if we identify the cash injection m = (1  )S and the haircut h = = (1  ). In the limit
"! 0, opportunistic participation disappears:
lim
"!0
U ( ) = Lo
Finally the program achieves the minimum cost in the limit:
lim
"!0
	( ) = 	min (I ( ) nIo)
Proof. See Appendix.
Figure 8 depicts the equilibrium under the e¢ cient mechanism. The intuition is that
the payo¤ structure to old shareholders is now:
f (ye) = min (ye; N + c0) + "max (y
e  N   c0; 0)
Old shareholders are full residual claimants up to the face value of old assets N + c0 and
" residual claimants beyond. A few properties are worth mentioning. First, the loan must
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be junior to all creditors but senior to common stock holders. Hence it could also be
implemented with preferred stock. It is crucial, however, that the government also takes
a position that is junior to shareholders. Dilution should happen on the upside to induce
participation of rms who need it, and to limit opportunistic participation.
The use of warrants also has some advantages that are likely to be important for reasons
outside the model. The rst advantage is that it limits risk shifting incentives since the
government owns the upside, not the old shareholders (see, for instance, Green (1984)).
Second, the government can credibly commit to protecting the shareholders since it owns
equity warrants. This is important because, conditional on not failing a bank, it makes no
sense to try and punish the shareholders.
In practice, there might be lower bound on ". It might be necessary to limit dilution to
avoid fears of nationalization. An approximate optimal program would then be to determine
rst the minimum value of ", and then to construct the program accordingly. Also the
haircut h is chosen to rule out ine¢ cient participation (the NIP constraint). In theory, any
h > 0 would work, but in practice, parameter uncertainty would prevent h from being too
close to zero.
7 Discussion of nancial crisis of 2007/09
The nancial crisis of 2007-2009 has underlined the importance of debt overhang. There is
agreement among many observers that debt overhang is an important reason for the decline
in lending and investment during the crisis (see Allen, Bhattacharya, Rajan, and Schoar
(2008) and Fama (2009), among others).
For example, Ivashina and Scharfstein (2008) show that new lending was 68% lower in
the three-month period around the Lehman bankruptcy relative to the three-month period
before the Lehman bankruptcy. Using cross-sectional variation in bank access to deposit
nancing, the authors show that the reduction in lending reects a reduction in credit
supply by banks rather than a reduction in credit demand by borrowers.
The crisis has also shown the di¢ culty of nding e¤ective solutions to the debt overhang
problem. Several experts have expressed concerns that existing bankruptcy procedures for
nancial institutions are insu¢ cient for reorganizing the capital structure. As an alterna-
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tive, Zingales (2008) argues for a law change that allows for forced debt-for-equity swaps.
Coates and Scharfstein (2009) suggest to restructure bank holding companies instead of
bank subsidiaries. Ayotte and Skeel (2009) argue that Chapter 11 proceedings are ade-
quate if managed properly by the government. Assuming that restructuring can be carried
e¤ectively, these approaches reduce debt overhang at low cost to the government. However,
Swagel (2009) argues that the government lacks the legal authority to force restructuring
and that changing bankruptcy procedures is politically infeasible once banks are in nancial
distress.
Moreover, concerns for systemic risk and contagion make it di¢ cult to restructure nan-
cial balance sheets in the midst of a nancial crisis. Aside from the costs of its own failure,
the bankruptcy of a large nancial institution may trigger further bankruptcies because of
counterparty risks and runs by creditors. For example, Heider, Hoerova, and Holthausen
(2008) emphasize the role of counterparty risk in the interbank market.
The government may therefore decide to avoid restructuring because there is a positive
probability of a breakdown of the entire nancial system. Even if the government decides to
let some institutions restructure, the government also has to address debt overhang among
the nancial institutions that do not restructure. In fact, even proponents of restructuring
suggest to rank banks based on their nancial health and only restructure banks below a cut-
o¤. Hence, independent of whether the government restructures some banks, the optimal
form of government intervention outside restructuring remains an important question.
Surprisingly however, while there is at least some agreement regarding the diagnostic
(debt overhang), there is considerable disagreement about the optimal form of government
intervention outside restructuring. The original bailout plan proposed by former Treasury
Secretary Paulson favors asset buy backs over other forms of interventions. Stiglitz (2008)
argues that equity injections are preferable to asset buy backs because the government can
participate in the upside if nancial institutions recover. Soros (2009a) also favors equity
injections over asset buy backs because otherwise banks sell their least valuable assets to the
government. Diamond, Kaplan, Kashyap, Rajan, and Thaler (2008) argue that the optimal
government policy should be a combination of both asset buy backs and equity injections
because asset buy backs establish prices in illiquid markets and equity injections encourage
new lending. Bernanke (2009) suggests that in addition to equity injections and debt
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guarantees the government should purchase hard-to-value assets to alleviate uncertainty
about bank solvency. Geithner (2009) argues that asset buy backs are necessary because
they support price discovery of risky assets.
Other observers have pointed out common elements among the di¤erent interventions
without necessarily endorsing a specic one. Ausubel and Cramton (2009) argue that both
asset buy backs and equity injections require to put a price on hard-to-value assets. Be-
bchuk (2008) argues that both asset buy backs and equity injections have to be conducted
at market values to avoid overpaying for bad assets. Soros (2009b) argues that bank recapi-
talization has to be compulsory rather than voluntary. Kashyap and Hoshi (2008) compare
the nancial crisis of 2007-2009 with the Japanese banking crisis and argue that in Japan
both asset buy backs and capital injections failed because the programs were too small.
Scharfstein and Stein (2008) argue that government interventions should restrict banks
from paying dividends because, if there is debt overhang, equity holders favor immediate
payouts over new investment. Acharya and Backus (2009) suggest that public lender of last
resort interventions would be less costly if they borrowed some of the standard tools used
in private contracts for lines of credit.
We believe our results in this paper make three contributions to this debate. First,
we believe an analytical approach to this question is helpful because it allows the govern-
ment to implement a principled approach in which nancial institutions are treated equally
and government actions are predictable. This approach is preferable to a trial-and-error
approach in which the government adjust interventions depending on current market condi-
tions and tailors interventions to requests of individual nancial institutions. In fact, such
a trial-and-error approach may create more uncertainty for private investors, which makes
them even less willing to invest. Uncertainty also generates an option to wait for future
interventions, which further undermines private recapitalizations. Moreover, tailor-made
interventions are more likely to be inuenced and distorted by powerful incumbents (see
Hart and Zingales (2008), Johnson (2009)).
Second, we distinguish the economic forces that matter from the ones that do not by
providing a benchmark in which the form of government interventions is irrelevant. Under
symmetric information, all interventions implement the same level of lending at the same
expected costs. In contrast, under asymmetric information buying equity dominates other
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forms of intervention because buying equity reduces the extent of adverse selection across
banks. Our analysis also shows how the government can use warrants to minimize the
expected cost to taxpayers, an important element which has not been emphasized in the
public debate on the nancial crisis. Interestingly, Swagel (2009) notes that the terms of
the Capital Purchase Program, the rst round of government intervention, consisted of pro-
viding a loan in exchange for preferred shares and warrants. This structure is qualitatively
consistent with the optimal intervention.
Third, our analysis claries why government interventions are costly. Under symmetric
information, equity holders are held to their participation constraint but debt holders re-
ceive an implicit transfer. Hence, the same economic force that generates debt overhang in
the rst place, also generate the cost to the government. Under asymmetric information,
participating banks receive rents because otherwise they would choose not to participate.
Hence, under asymmetric information government interventions are costly because the gov-
ernment has to recapitalize at above market rates.
Finally, we note that our analysis does not address why the banking system entered
nancial distress and whether government bailouts a¤ect future bank actions. In our model,
we take the debt overhang as given and rely on other research that links the nancial
crisis to securitization (Mian and Su (2008), Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010))
and the tendency of banks to become highly levered (Adrian and Shin (2008), Acharya
and Schnabl (2009)). Regarding the impact of government interventions on future bank
actions, we recognize that bailouts can create expectations of future bailouts which may
cause moral hazard. However, if the government decides to intervene, then it is optimal for
the government to choose the intervention with the lowest costs. In addition, the optimal
intervention minimizes the rents to equity and debt holders, so the optimal intervention
also minimizes moral hazard concerns conditional on the decision to intervene.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we study the e¢ ciency and welfare implications of di¤erent government in-
terventions in a standard model with debt overhang. We consider asset buy backs, cash
against equity injections, and debt guarantees. We nd that under symmetric information,
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all interventions are equivalent. Under asymmetric information between the government
and the private sector, equity injections dominate both asset buy backs and debt guaran-
tees, and buyback programs are strictly worse when there is adverse selection within banks,
in addition to adverse selection across banks.
Comparing voluntary and compulsory programs, we nd that compulsory programs are
more likely to be e¢ cient if the intervention is large. We also show that deposit insurance
reduces the expected cost of all government interventions. In the limit case in which deposits
are always risky, the benet of a bailout accrues to the government itself and the optimal
solution is therefore to implement the rst best at negative expected cost. Finally, we solve
for the optimal mechanism. We nd that the government should provide a subordinated
loan (or buy preferred stock) in exchange for warrants.
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Proof of Theorem 1
We show the equivalence result in the case of a binary distribution for asset value a.
Cash against equity
The government o¤ers cash m against fraction  of equity capital. The investment domain
I (m) is the same as in the case of pure cash injections. At time 0, shareholders participate
in the intervention if
(1  )E0 [ye (m)]  E0 [ye (0)] : (20)
The cost of the program to the government is
	e0 (m;) = m  E0 [ye (m)] :
Because the investment domain does not depend on , the government chooses equity share
 such that the participation constraint (20) binds. Expected shareholder values at time 0
are
E0 [y
e] = p (N + c0) +
ZZ
Io
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) ;
E0 [y
e (m)] = p (N + c0 +m) +
Z Z
I(m)
(Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m) dF (p; v) :
Using the participation constraint (20) to eliminate  from the cost function yields
	e0 (m;) = m  (E0 [yejm]  E0 [ye])
with
E0 [y
e (m)]  E0 [ye] = pm+m
Z Z
I(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) +
Z Z
I(m)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
The expected cost of the optimally designed program is 0 (m) dened in equation (19).
Asset buy back
Under the asset buy back program, we have c1 = c0 + Zpz. Hence the investment domain
becomes I (Zpz). The expected shareholder value at time 0 is
E0 [y
e (z; pz)] = p (N + c0   (1  pz)Z) +
Z Z
I(Zpz)
(Lo (p; v) + (1  p)Zpz) dF (p; v):
Shareholders participate in the program if
E0 [y
e (Z; pz)]  E0 [ye (0; 0)] : (21)
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Because the investment domain only depends on the total repurchase amount Zpz; the
government chooses to satisfy participation constraint (21) with equality. As a result, the
participation constraint (21) yields
p (1  pz)Z = Zpz
Z Z
I(Zpz)
(1  p) dF (p; v) +
Z Z
I(Zpz)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
Therefore the cost to the government is
	a0(Z; p
z) = Zpz   Z p
= (1  p)Zpz   Zpz
Z Z
I(Zpz)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(Zpz)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
= 0(Zp
z):
The program is equivalent to cash against equity when m = Zpz.
Debt guarantee
Under the program c1 = c0+(1  )S. Hence the investment domain becomes I ((1  )S).
The expected shareholder value at time 0 is
E0 [y
e (S; 1  )] = p (N + c0   S) +
Z Z
I((1 )S)
(Lo (p; v) + (1  p) (1  )S) dF (p; v)
This is equivalent to the asset buy back program if we set S = Z and pz = 1  .
Proof of Theorem 2
We show the equivalence result in the case of a general distribution for asset value a.
No intervention
As a benchmark, we rst solve the debt overhang model without government interventions.
Banks invest if
E[yejp; 1]  E[yejp; 0]Z A
D+rl v
(a D + v   rl) dG (ajp) 
Z A
D c
(a D + c) dG (ajp)
which is equivalent to
v   rl > c() v   c > r (x  c)() v   x > (r   1) (x  c) :
This investment decision is the same condition as in the binary payo¤ model. The break
even constraint for junior creditors is
E[yljp]  l
rl
Z A
D+rl v
dG (ajp) +
Z D+rl v
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp)  l:
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Under assumption A1, the break even constraint is binding and pins down the interest rate
r (p; v;D; c) : The di¤erence to the binary payo¤ model is that the interest rate depends
not only on p but also on (v;D; c): Adding the investment condition and the break-even
constraint yieldsZ A
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp)  l +
Z A
D c
(a+ c D) dG (ajp) :
Using l = x  c, we rearrange the terms to get the investment region
Lo (p; v) = v
Z A
D c
dG (ajp) +
Z D c
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp) + c
Z D c
0
dG (ajp)  x (22)
Shareholder value in the investment region is
E1 [y
ejp; v] = E1 [yjp; v]  E1

yDjp; v  E1 hyljp; vi
=
Z A
D c
(a+ c D) dG (ajp) + Lo (p; v) :
Expected shareholder value at time 0 and at time 1 are
E1 [y
ejp; v] =
Z A
D c
(a+ c D) dG (ajp) + Lo (p; v) 1(p;v)2Io
E0 [y
e] =
Z A
D c
(a+ c D) dF0 (a) +
ZZ
Io
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
Cash against equity
Suppose the government purchases equity share  in exchange for cash m. All equations
to the debt overhang analysis still apply except c = c0 +m. Hence, expected shareholder
value at time 0 is
E0 [y
e (m)] =
Z A
D c0 m
(a+ c0 +m D) dF0 (a) +
Z Z
I(m)
Lm (p; v) dF (p; v)
with
Lm (p; v)  v
Z A
D c0 m
dG (ajp)+
Z D c0 m
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp)+(c0 +m)
Z D c0 m
0
dG (ajp) x:
The equity holder participation constraint is
E0 [y
e (m)]  E0 [ye (0)]  E0 [ye (m)]
and the cost to the government is
	(m) = m  E0 [ye (m)] :
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Because the investment domain only depends on m; the government chooses equity share
 to ensure that the equity holder participation constraint is binding. Hence, we have
	(m) = m  (E0 [ye (m)]  E0 [ye (0)])
with
E0 [y
e (m)]  E0 [ye (0)] = m
Z A
D c0
dF0 (a) +
Z D c0
D c0 m
(a+m+ c0  D) dF0 (a)
+
Z Z
I(m)
Lm (p; v) dF (p; v) 
ZZ
Io
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
Asset buy back
The cost of asset buy backs depends on the structure of debt covenants. Consistent with
the binary asset distribution case, we dene e¢ cient debt covenants for the continuous asset
distribution case as follows. We assume banks can sell assets to the government with bank
payo¤ a  (a) and government payo¤ (a). Debt covenants are restrictions on the function
 (a) : We assume covenants are e¢ cient if and only if for any asset distribution F , debt
holders receive at least the expected payo¤ they would receive without asset buy backs:
 (a) acceptable i¤
Z A
0
min (a+ c   (a) ; D) dF (a) 
Z A
0
min (a+ c;D) dF (a)  for all F
Suppose there exists an asset payo¤ ba < D   c such that  (ba) > 0. Then choose the
distribution f (ba) = 1: Note that ba+c  (ba) < ba+c which violates the condition. Similarly,
if there is an ba > D  c with ba+ c   (ba) < D, the condition is violated. So the solution is
that  must satisfy:
 (a) = 0 for all a  D   c
 (a)  a+ c D for all a > D   c
In words, e¢ cient covenants ensure that senior debt holders have priority over asset
purchasers for any asset distribution F: So bank payo¤ are ~a = a   (a) with  (a) = 0 for
all a  D   c and  (a)  a+ c D for a > D   c. The investment condition for asset buy
backs is:Z D c
D+rl v
(a+ v  D   rl) dG (ajp) +
Z A
D c
(~a+ v  D   rl) dG (ajp) >
Z A
D c
(~a+ c D) dG (ajp)Z D c
D+rl v
(a+ v  D   rl) dG (ajp) +
Z A
D c
(v   rl   c) dG (ajp) > 0() v   rl   c > 0
The participation constraint for junior creditors is:
rl
Z A
D+rl v
dG (ajp) +
Z D+rl v
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp)  l
Note that the investment condition is the same as with cash against equity and inde-
pendent of ~a. Hence, the investment region is the same (with c = c0 +m). The cost to the
government is
	 = m  E0 [ (a)] :
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Because the investment region only depends on cash c; the government chooses  (a) to
ensure that the participation constraint is binding. Note that  (a) comes entirely from
shareholder payo¤s because senior debt holders are protected by covenants. As a result, the
expected proceeds from asset buy backs are
E0 [ (a)] = E0 [y
e (m)]  E0 [ye] :
Note that the expected cost to the government is the same as under cash against equity.
Debt guarantee
Under the debt guarantee, the proceeds from issuing debt at time 1 are
c = c0 + (1  )S:
The investment condition isZ A
D+S+rl v
(a+ v  D   rl   S) dG (ajp) 
Z A
D+S c
(a+ c D   S) dG (ajp) :
Hence, the investment condition is again v  rl > c. It is important that the government is
junior to time 1 creditors, otherwise the government creates its own debt overhang. Under
this assumption, the break-even constraint for junior creditors is
rl
Z A
D+rl v
dG (ajp) +
Z D+rl v
D v
(a+ v  D) dG (ajp)  l
Note that this means the interest rate is the same as in the cash against equity case.
In particular it does not depend on the face value of debt issuance S. As a result, the
investment region is the same as in cash against equity.
Regarding the costs of the program, there are two alternative interpretations. The rst
one is that the bank borrows directly from government. Then government recoversZ
(p;v)2I(m)
Z A
D+rl v
min (a+ v  D   rl; S) dG (ajp)+
Z
(p;v)=2I(m)
Z A
D c
min (a+ c D;S) dG (ajp)
which is equivalent to E0 [ye (m; 0)]   E0 [ye (m;S)]. The binding participation constraint
implies that
E0 [y
e (m;S)] = E0 [y
e]
so the cost to the government is
	 = (1  )S   (E0 [ye (m; 0)]  E0 [ye]) = m  (E0 [ye (m)]  E0 [ye]) :
which is the same costs as for the other interventions. An alternative interpretation is
that the government covers losses ex-post. This yields the same calculation because the
government gets S up-front and then pays S minus the recovery in good states which is
the same as above because E0 [ye (m; 0)]  E0 [ye (m;S)] :
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Proof of Theorem 3
We rst analyze the asset buy back program at time 1. To prove the theorem, we must
show equivalence along four dimensions: (i) the NIP constraint, (ii) the upper schedule,
(iii) the lower schedule, and (iv) the cost function.
Upon participation and investment, equity value is
E1[y
e (z; pz) jp; v; i = 1] = p (N + c0   z) + Lo (p; v) + pzz:
Participation without investment yields
E1[y
e (z; pz) jp; v; i = 0] = p (N + c0   z + pzz) :
Now consider the three constraints:
 NIP: E1[ye (z; pz) jp; v; i = 0] < E1[ye (0; 0) jp; v; i = 0] or
pz < 1:
 Upper schedule: E1[ye (0; 0) jp; v; i = 1] > E1[ye (z; pz) jp; v; i = 1] or
p > pz:
 Lower schedule: E1[ye (z; pz) jp; v; i = 1] > E1[ye (0; 0) jp; v; i = 0] or
La1 (p; v; z; p
z)  Lo (p; v) + (pz   p) z > 0:
Note that banks therefore set z either to 0 or to Z. Using the notations of the debt
guarantee section, the participation set is

g1 (Z; 1  pz)
where 
g1 is dened above in equation (16). The expected cost of the program is
	a1 (Z; p
z) = Z
Z Z

g(Z;1 pz)
(pz   p) dF (p; v) = g1 (Z; 1  pz)
and the investment domain is
Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz) :
Now if we set S = Z and pz = 1  , we see that the NIP constraint, the upper and lower
schedules, and the cost function are the same for the asset buy back program as for the
debt guarantee program. The two programs are therefore equivalent.
Proof of Theorem 4
We rst analyze the cash against equity program at time 1. Upon participation and invest-
ment, equity value (including the share going to the government) is
E1[y
e (m) jp; v; i = 1] = p (N + c0) + Lo (p; v) +m
Participation without investment yields
E1[y
e (m) jp; v; i = 0] = p(N + c0 +m)
Now consider the three constraints
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 NIP: (1  )E1[ye (m) jp; v; i = 0] < E1[ye (0) jp; v; i = 0] or:
(1  )m <  (N + c0) :
 Upper schedule: E1[ye (0) jp; v; i = 1] > (1  )E1[ye (m) jp; v; i = 1] or:
 (p (N + c0) + L
o (p; v)) > (1  )m:
 Lower schedule: (1  )E1[ye (m) jp; v; i = 1] > E1[ye (0) jp; v; i = 0] or:
(1  ) (Lo (p; v) +m) > p (N + c0) :
We dene the function
X (p;m;)  (1  )m  p (N + c0)
We can summarize the cash against equity program by:
Le1 (p; v;m;)  (1  )Lo (p; v) +X (p;m;)
U e1 (p; v;m;)  Lo (p; v) X (p;m;)
NIP : X (1;m;) < 0:
The participation set is

e1 (m;) = f(p; v) j Le1 (p; v;m;) > 0 ^ U e1 (p; v;m;) < 0g :
The cost function is therefore
	e1 (m;) =
Z Z

e1(m;)
(m  E1[ye (m;) jp; v; i = 1]) dF (p; v) :
We can rewrite the cost function such that
	e1 (m;) =
Z Z

e1(m;)
X (p;m;) dF (p; v)  
Z Z

e1(m;)
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
The following table provides a comparison of the three government interventions:
Debt guarantee Asset buy back Equity injection
Participation 
g1 (S; ) 

g
1 (Z; 1  pz) 
e1 (m;)
Investment I1 Io [ 
g1 (S; ) Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz) Io [ 
e1 (m;)
NIP constraint  > 0 pz < 1 X (1;m; ) < 0
Cost function g1 (S; ) 
g
1 (Z; 1  pz) 	e1 (m;)
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Now let us prove that the cash against equity program dominates the other two programs.
Take a program S; . We are going to construct an equity program that has same welfare
gains at lower cost. To get equity with same lower bound graph we need to ensure that:
Le1 (p; v;m;) = L
g
1 (p; v;S; ) for all p; v:
So we must have
X (p;m;) = (1  ) (1    p)S for all p: (23)
It is easy to see that this is indeed possible if we identify term by term: 1  =
S
A+c0 D
and m = (1  )S. Therefore it is possible to implement exactly the same lower schedules.
Formally, we have just shown that:
Ig1 (S; ) = I
e
1 (m;) :
Next notice that the NIP constraints are equivalent since:
X (1;m; ) < 0()  > 0:
Now consider the upper bound. Consider the lowest point on the upper schedule of
the guarantee program, i.e., the intersection of Ug1 (p; v;S; ) = 0 with L
o (p; v) = 0.
At that point, we have ~p = 1    and ~v = (x  c0) = (1  ). But from (23), it is
clear that X (~p;m;) = 0, and therefore U e1 (~p; ~v;m;) = L
o (~p; ~v)   X (~p;m;) =
0. Therefore the upper schedule U e1 (p; v;m;) = 0 also passes by this point. But the
schedule U e1 (p; v;m;) = 0 is downward slopping in (p; v), so the domain of ine¢ cient par-
ticipation is smaller (see Figure 7) than in the debt guarantee case. Formally, we have just
shown that:

e1 (m;)  
g1 (S; ) :
As an aside, it is also easy to see that the schedule U e1 (p; v;m;) = 0 is above the schedule
Lo (p; v) = 0 so it does not get rid completely of opportunistic participation, but it helps.
The nal step is to compare the cost functions.
g1 (S; )  S
Z Z

g1(S;)
(1  p  ) dF (p; v)
	e1 (m;) =
Z Z

e1(m;)
X (p;m;) dF (p; v)  
Z Z

e1(m;)
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
By denition of the participation domain, we know that Le1 (p; v;m;) > 0. Therefore:
 
Z Z

e1(m;)
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) <
X (p;m;)
1   for all (p; v) 2 

e
1 (m;)
Therefore
	e1 (m;) <
1
1  
Z Z

e1(m;)
X (p;m;) dF (p; v) = S
Z Z

e1(m;)
(1    p) dF (p; v)
Finally, since 1      p > 0 for all (p; v) 2 
e1 (m;), and since 
e1 (m;)  
g1 (S; ), we
have
	e1 (m;) < 
g
1 (S; ) :
43
Proof of Proposition 4
Cost Function at Time 0
First we dene vm0 (p) as
Lo (p; vm0 (p)) + (1  p)m = 0:
Then we dene the piecewise linear function function
 (v; p)  pm[0;vm0 (p)] + (L
o (p; v) + (1  p)m)) 1[vm0 (p);v0(p)] +m1[v0(p);1]:
We rewrite the cost function of the cash program as
0 (m;F ) = m 
ZZ
p;v
 (v; p) dF (p; v)
= m  E [ (v; p) jF ] :
The function  is increasing in v and in p, therefore FOSD of ~F on F , implies that
E
h
 (v; p) j ~F
i
> E [ (v; p) jF ]. Hence, 0

m; ~F

< 0 (m;F ).
Time 1 programs can dominate
First we choose a time 0 program with cash m and optimal cost 0 (m). Then we choose
a time 1 debt guarantee program with  = 0 and S = m to get same investment set. The
cost of the debt guarantee program is
g1 (m; 0) = m
Z Z
I(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v)
0 (m) = m
Z Z
TnI(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(m)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
Where T = [0; V ] [0; 1]. Clearly, we have g1 (m; 0) < 0 (m) when
Z Z
I(m)
dF (p; v) is small
enough. Just because of the fact that time 1 programs do not give provide cash to banks
that do not invest. This is a fortiori true for equity injection since they dominate at time
1.
Time 0 programs can dominate
We consider a large government program such that all rms invest. Then it must be that
Zpz = x  c0 and pz = 1. We then choose m = x  c0. Then I (m) = I = 
(Z; pz). Now
g1 (Z; 0) > 0 (m)
()
(x  c0)
ZZ
I
(1  p) dF (p; v) > (x  c0)
Z Z
TnI
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
InIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
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Now clearly when Pr (I)! 1, then Pr (T n I)! 0, so (x  c0)
Z Z
TnI
(1  p) dF (p; v)! 0.
Over I, we know that v > x, hence  Lo (p; v) < (1  p) (x  c0), therefore
 
Z Z
InIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) < (x  c0)
Z Z
InIo
(1  p) dF (p; v)  (x  c0)
ZZ
I
(1  p) dF (p; v) :
Proof of Proposition 6
First note that the optimization problem from the equity holders perspective remains un-
changed because the investment and participation decision only depend on total debt D:
Now consider the expected cost of deposit insurance. Note that the time 0 expected value of
deposits is  because   A+ c0 Hence, the cost of government intervention is unchanged
and therefore the cost and benets of both time 0 and time 1 programs are unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 7
We distinguish two cases depending on the recovery rate on deposits in the low payo¤ state.
Time 0 Programs
Full transfer: A+ v < 
The expected values of deposits at time 1 and time 0 are
E1

y (m) jp; v = p+ (1  p) (A+ c0 +m) if (p; v) 2 TnI0 (m)
= p+ (1  p) (A+ v) if (p; v) 2 I0 (m)
E0

y (m)

= p+ (1  p) (A+ c0 +m) +
Z Z
I0(m)
(1  p) (v   c0  m) dF (p; v) :
The expected cost of deposit insurance at time 0 is
	F0 (m) =   E0

y (m)

= (1  p) ( A  c0  m) 
Z Z
I0(m)
(1  p) (v   c0  m) dF (p; v)
The change in the expected cost of deposit insurance is
F0 (m) = 	
F
0 (m) 	F0 (0)
=   (1  p)m+m
Z Z
I0(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I0(m)nIo
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v) :
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The net cost of government intervention is
0 (m) + 
F
0 (m) =  
Z Z
I0(m)nIo
(v   c0) dF (p; v):
Note that this term is negative because the benets of incremental investments accrue to
the government.
Partial Transfer: A+ c0 <  < A+ v
The expected values of deposits at time 1 and time 0 are
E1

y (m) jp; v = p+ (1  p)max (; A+ c0 +m) if (p; v) 2 TnI0 (m)
=  if (p; v) 2 I0 (m)
E0

y (m)

=  
Z Z
TnI0(m)
(1  p) ( max (; A+ c0 +m)) dF (p; v)
The expected cost of deposit insurance is
	F0 (m) =
Z Z
TnI0(m)
(1  p) ( max (; A+ c0 +m)) dF (p; v):
The change in the expected cost of deposit insurance
F0 (m) =
Z Z
TnI0(m)
(1  p) ( max (; A+ c0 +m)) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
TnIo
(1  p) ( A  c0) dF (p; v):
Note that when  ! (A+ c0), then F0 (m) ! 0: This means the expected change in
the cost of deposit insurance goes to zero as deposits become safe. Also note that when
! (A+ v) ; then
F0 (m)!   (1  p)m+m
Z Z
I0(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I0(m)nIo
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v)
which is the change in expected cost of deposit insurance in the full transfer case. The
government cost is F0 (m)+0 (m) : The results apply to all programs because all programs
have the same cost function at time 0.
Asset buy backs at time 1
Full Transfer: A+ v < 
The expected values of deposits at time 1 and time 0 are
E1

y (Z; pz) jp; v = p+ (1  p) (A+ c0) if (p; v) 2 Tn (Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz))
= p+ (1  p) (A+ v) if (p; v) 2 Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz)
E0

y (Z; pz)

= p+ (1  p) (A+ c0) +
Z Z
Io[
g1(Z;1 pz)
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v)
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The expected cost of deposit insurance is
	F0 (Z; p
z) = (1  p) ( A  c0) 
Z Z
Io[
g1(Z;1 pz)
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v)
The change in the cost of deposit insurance is
F0 (Z; p
z) =  
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)=Io
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v)
Expected government cost is
	a1 (Z; p
z) = Z
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)
(pz   p) dF (p; v)
=  (Z; 1  pz) 
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)=Io
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v) :
Partial Transfer: A+ c0 <  < A+ v
The expected values of deposits at time 1 and time 0 are
E1

y (Z; pz) jp; v = p+ (1  p) (A+ c0) if (p; v) 2 Tn (Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz))
=  if (p; v) 2 Io [ 
g1 (Z; 1  pz)
E0

y (Z; pz)

=  
Z Z
Tn(Io[
g1(Z;1 pz))
(1  p) ( A  c0) dF (p; v)
The expected cost of government insurance is
	F0 (Z; p
z) =
Z Z
Tn(Io[
g1(Z;1 pz))
(1  p) ( A  c0) dF (p; v):
The change in expected cost of deposit insurance is
F0 (Z; p
z) =  
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)=Io
(1  p) ( A  c0) dF (p; v) :
Note that when  ! (A+ c0), then F0 (Z; pz) ! 0: Also note that when  ! (A+ v) ;
then
F0 (Z; p
z)!  
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)=Io
(1  p) (v   c0) dF (p; v) :
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Total government cost is
	a1 (Z; p
z) = Z
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)
(pz   p) dF (p; v)
=  (Z; 1  pz) 
Z Z

g1(Z;1 pz)=Io
(1  p) ( A  c0) dF (p; v) :
The results also apply to debt guarantees at time 1 because asset buy backs and debt
guarantees have the same cost function at time1.
Cash against equity at time 1
Note that we can compute the expected cost of time 1 cash against equity similarly to the
time 1 asset buy back program. The only di¤erence is the participation region for cash
against equity 
e (m;) and the participation region for asset buy back 
g1 (Z; 1  pz). It
turns out that the change in the expected cost of deposit insurance F0 (m) is equivalent
under both programs because both in the full and partial transfer case the di¤erence in the
participation region cancels out when computing the di¤erence in expected cost of deposit
insurance. It follows that the relative ranking of programs is unchanged.
Proof of Proposition 8
To illustrate the logic, we compare the debt guarantee at time 0 with the optional debt
guarantee at time 0. Participation is decided at time 0. Banks give an equity share  in
exchange for the right (not the obligation) to use the debt guarantee program (S; ) at time
1. The increase in shareholder value is
E0 [y
e ( )]  E0 [ye] =
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)
Lg1 (p; v;S; ) dF (p; v) 
ZZ
Io
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
= S
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)
(1    p) dF (p; v) +
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
= g1 (S; ) +
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
If the government asks for equity in exchange at time 0, then the net cost to the government
is
~0 (S; ) =  
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
We compare the cost to the government with:
0 (m) = m
Z Z
TnI(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(m)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) :
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Where T = [0; V ] [0; 1]. It is clear that with s = m, the investment domains are the same,
and the cost saving is
0 (s) ~0 (S; ) = m
Z Z
TnI(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v) 
Z Z
I(m)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)+
Z Z
Ig1 (S;)nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
So it is clear that the ex-ante optional program strictly dominates in all cases. First, one
can always set  = 0+ and S = m in which case Ig1 (S; ) = I (m) and the cost reduction is
m
Z Z
TnI(m)
(1  p) dF (p; v)
which corresponds to idle cash wasted on banks that do not make new investment.
Proof of Proposition 9
We now show that pure equity dominates over combination of equity with other programs.
Let m be cash injection, i.e., sum of m0 from equity and pzZ from asset buy-back. We
dene the function
X (p)  (1  ) (m  pZ)  p (N + c0)
The three constraints are:
NIP : X (1) < 0
L  (1  )Lo (p; v) +X (p)
U  Lo (p; v) X (p)
The participation set is

 = f(p; v) j L > 0 ^ U < 0g
The cost function is
	 =
ZZ


X (p) dF (p; v)  
ZZ


Lo (p; v) dF (p; v) (24)
Now take any program. To get the same investment set, we need the same lower bound and
therefore the same function X (p). But then we now from (24) that the cost function is the
same. Also we know that the NIP constraint is X (1) < 0, so it is also the same. Thus, all
that matters is the participation domain 
. So we need only to look at the upper bound
U . We want to exclude as many banks as possible, so we want U to be as high as possible.
The way to do so is obviously to have  as high as possible. But of course we must keep
the function X= (1  ) constant. Therefore we must keep Z + 1  (N + c0) constant. As
 goes up, Z must go down. Therefore we want to set Z = 0. Therefore asset buy back
cannot improve the equity program. The same proof also applies to debt guarantees.
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Proof of Proposition 10
In the good state, the residual payo¤s conditional on investment are
N + c0 +m+
Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m
p
The loan is repaid rst. Then shareholders receive
ye = max

N + c0 +
Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m
p
  hm; 0

if i = 1 and a = A
ye = max (N + c0   hm; 0) if i = 0 and a = A:
As soon as ye > N + c0, the warrants are in the money and the number of shares jumps
to 1 + 1 "" =
1
" . So the old shareholders get only a fraction " of the value beyond N + c0.
Their payo¤ function is therefore:
f (ye) = min (ye; N + c0) + "max (y
e  N   c0; 0) :
So old shareholders are full residual claimants up to the face value of old assets N+c0 and "
residual claimants beyond. Now let us think about their decisions at time 1. As usual only
the payo¤s in the non default state matter. If they do not invest they get N + c0. If they
invest, they receive more if and only if Lo (p; v)+(1  p)m > phm. The lower participation
constraint is therefore
Lo (p; v) + (1  (1 + h) p)m > 0:
It converges to Lo (p; v) + (1  p)m if h! 0. We can compare this to the equity injection
schedule Le1 (p; v;m;), we can identify the same cash injection m, and the dilution factor
 =
m (1 + h)
N + c0 +m (1 + h)
:
If we compare to debt guarantee Lg1 (p; v;S; ) = L
o (p; v) + (1    p)S. Then
m = (1  )S and h = 
1  :
Next consider the upper schedule. Investing alone gets N + c0 + Lo (p; v) =p so they opt in
if and only if Lo (p; v) > " (Lo (p; v) + (1  (1 + h) p)m) and therefore
U = Lo (p; v) m"1  (1 + h) p
1  " :
The upper bound converges to Lo (p; v) when "! 0. The NIP constraint is simply
h > 0:
Finally, the cost of the program is small because the government gets all the upside value
of the new projects. The expected payments to the old shareholders converge to p (N + c0).
So the government receives expected value Lo (p; v) +m by paying m at time 1. The total
cost is therefore:
 
Z Z
I( )nIo
Lo (p; v) dF (p; v)
The cost is positive because Lo (p; v) < 0 for all (p; v) 2 I (m) nIo.
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